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Abstract 
Policy scientists and public policymakers are continuously struggling with the 
troublesome relationship between knowledge and policy. On the one hand, policy and 
policy processes are generally recognized as having a political nature because they 
prioritize the generation of will rather than knowledge. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
accept that knowledge is being wasted or used strategically. One of the main challenges 
for public policymakers is to reconcile the political rationality of policy processes with 
the scientific rationality of knowledge and research, for instance by intelligent 
organization of knowledge generation and knowledge use. This article aims to contribute 
to the debate on this topic by comparing three policy implementation processes in which 
knowledge played an authoritative role. On the basis of this analysis of these three ‘white 
ravens,’ lessons are drawn regarding the conditions under which knowledge becomes 
authoritative in policy implementation practices. 
 





In our current network society, the average education level is high, knowledge and 
resources are distributed among a large number of organizations, the media offer 
platforms for critical review of scientific results and citizens have access to expertise 
through new social media like the Internet. As a result, scientific knowledge, experts and 
knowledge institutions increasingly have difficulty gaining authoritativeness and 
influencing policies. An illustrative example is the authority crisis faced by climate 
scientists when the reports published by the International Panel on Climate Change in 
2007 were found to contain inaccuracies (Berkhout 2010). At the same time, politicians 
and policymakers are advocating the use of knowledge and scientific evidence. The 
evidence-based policy movement has surfaced in the wake of the New Public 
Management reforms that have inundated the public administration landscape in the past 
decades. Politicians and policymakers strive for a more goal-oriented and effective policy 
practice. Their ambition is a policy that is evidence based (Solesbury 2001, Pawson 
2006). Evidence-based policy is based upon objective knowledge – knowledge that has 
been generated through sound scientific methods (Banks 2009). Evidence refers to 
knowledge about ‘what works’ (best practices) that can be deployed in comparable policy 
situations in a uniform manner (Davies et al. 2000). This perspective combines a 
positivist notion of science with an instrumental outlook on use.  
The observation that, despite these ambitions, expertise and scientific knowledge 
have difficulty finding their way into policy is not new. Nevertheless, the problem seems 
to be becoming increasingly pressing. Theory about knowledge and knowledge-related 
policy offers a number of explanations for the troublesome transition of scientific 
knowledge to actual application in policy formation and implementation processes. 
  
- Policymakers’ openness towards knowledge. The earlier debate about knowledge use 
in policymaking has led to the conclusion that an instrumental view on knowledge 
use cannot be reconciled with the political nature of policy processes (Weiss 1977, 
Wildavsky 1979, Patton 1997, Radin 2002). In the arenas in which politicians, public 
administrators and stakeholders try to achieve their policy preferences, knowledge is 
a source of power, and research is used to legitimize policy. Knowledge that supports 
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policy intentions is embraced. If knowledge is inconvenient to policymakers’ 
preferences however, policymakers will ignore research results, interpret them in their 
favour or use them selectively. Will and knowledge are sometimes in conflict 
(Wildavsky 1979, in ’t Veld 2000, Flyvbjerg 2008). 
 
- The network-like nature of the policy formation and implementation process. In our 
current, complex society, policy is often made and implemented in networks 
involving various governmental organizations and societal stakeholders. These policy 
networks of autonomous, yet mutually dependent actors increasingly have a loosely 
coupled nature, often lacking a shared perception of the problem at hand (Mazmanian 
and Sabatier 1981; O’Toole 1988; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). If one of these parties 
supports its policy preferences with scientific research or invoked expertise, the 
others are not easily convinced (Gibbons et al. 1994, Jasanoff 1994). Knowledge 
monopolies traditionally held by, for instance, scientific institutions such as the Dutch 
Institute for Public Health and Environment are increasingly questioned. Parties then 
tend to invoke counter-expertise (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Consequently, experts 
and researchers engage in policy advocacy practices that lead to knowledge conflicts 
and debate. Conflicting truth claims, knowledge arguments and ‘report wars’ may be 
the result. This accumulation of ‘contested truths’ makes it difficult for parties to 
recognize what is true and which knowledge claims and experts are trustworthy 
(Hoppe 1999; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993;). In the case of ‘wicked’ problems, 
evidence is always ambiguous, and research does not reduce uncertainty, but adds to 
it (Noordergraaf 2000, de Bruijn and Leijten 2010). 
 
- The nature of the process of knowledge generation. The authoritativeness of 
knowledge is openly questioned, and not just because high quality research becomes 
subject to power games or because opportunistic researchers succumb to ‘policy 
advocacy’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Wildavky, 1995). Another explanation 
lies in the nature of knowledge generation itself. The positivistic notion that scientific 
knowledge is the result of objective data and that it produces indisputable truths does 
not reflect the actual process of knowledge generation (Nowotny et al. 2001, Polanyi 
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2009. All research has its limitations. After all, choices are made with respect to 
focus, definitions, conceptual models, methods and data interpretation (In ‘t Veld 
2000). This observation has various implications. First of all, the quality of the 
evidence may be problematic and therefore have a negative impact on its use. Simple 
scientific models are not necessarily applicable in complex environments (Collins and 
Evans 2007). In addition, it may be that research or evidence is not conclusive. If 
institutional monopolies are weakened, results of scientific research may well diverge 
or experts may disagree on interpretations, methods or facts. If evidence is not 
conclusive or if actors have doubt about its quality due to the non-transparency of the 
knowledge production process, its authoritativeness is at stake. 
 
- The availability of alternative knowledge sources. Finally, it is important to note that 
not all knowledge is scientific by nature, or comes from experts. Different knowledge 
sources exist. In addition to hard, scientific evidence, there are softer forms of 
knowledge derived from various sources, including the tacit knowledge of politicians 
and public administrators, the local knowledge of policy implementers, and the 
common knowledge of social networks of citizens, stakeholders and target groups 
(Hess and Ostrom 2006, Head 2007). Social media also provide parties with 
knowledge that may compete with that of experts and knowledge institutions. If 
parties have access to alternative knowledge sources, the truth claims made by 
experts and knowledge institutions are vulnerable (Bijker et al. 2009). This is 
particularly true if they are based on positivistic notions about science, and if they 
claim to present absolute truths.  
 
In short, the authority of knowledge and research in processes of policymaking 
and implementation is no longer self-evident. This, however, does not reduce the 
relevance and topicality of the ambition to base policy on expert knowledge and the 
findings of scientific research. The main question is therefore how knowledge and 
research can become authoritative in complex policy environments. This contribution 
addresses this question by analysing three Dutch cases in which knowledge succeeded in 
becoming authoritative in the processes of policy formation and implementation. These 
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case studies deviate from the standard idea that policies are the result of political struggle 
and often lack solid empirical fundaments. In the Netherlands, the expression ‘white 
rave’ is used to refer to an exceptional phenomenon. Therefore we consider these cases to 
be ‘white ravens’.  
 
2. A comparative case study of three white ravens 
 
In this article, we focus on the aforementioned question using three case studies in which 
policymakers in the Netherlands substantiate their policies with extensive scientific 
research. The knowledge used in these policies has a more than average scientific basis 
and in that respect these cases can be considered atypical.’ But next, these policies have 
to be implemented in complex setting in which various actors are involved. Whether or 
not the cases will really deserve their status of ‘white ravens’ will depend upon the extent 
to which the knowledge on which the policies are based, will gain authoritativeness in the 
policy implementation process.    
 We investigate the factors that influenced the authoritativeness of the knowledge 
on which the policies studied were based in the arenas of  policy implementation, and the 
lessons that can be learned from these cases about the role of scientific knowledge and 
research in policy making and implementation.  
The following cases are analysed:  
1. The objective dispensing model that allocates government budgets for social 
assistance among municipalities as described in the Law on Social Security and Work 
(2004–2009); 
2. The regulation on the discharge of warm water as described in the Law on Pollution 
of Surface Water (2005–2009);  
3. Central government’s policy aimed at energy conservation in houses based on the 
European Directive Energy Performance Building Sector (2008–2010).   
The scientific knowledge used in these cases was expressed in a model, involving 
in two cases a multi-linear regression model (objective dispensing model, energy 
performance model), and in one case a simulation model (discharge of warm water). 
Hereafter, we use the terms model or models when referring to the scientific knowledge 
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used in the selected cases. The outcomes of the policies are to a very large extent 
determined by the characteristics of the model. 
Therefore, the scientific knowledge in the case studies is considered authoritative 
if the public, semi-public and private actors involved in the policy implementation 
process accept the characteristics and the outcomes of the model. The characteristics of 
the model are: model assumptions, definitions, framework conditions, the choice of 
variables, the relations between variables, the operationalization of the variables and the 
empirical basis of the variables. A model is not authoritative if actors in the 
implementation process criticize the model, oppose its use, and propose or pursue 
alternative policies, or if they reject the outcomes of the model, for instance by starting 
administrative or legal proceedings.  
The empirical basis of the three case studies consists of literature research and 
interviews. Literature comprises documents on the development and implementation of 
the policies and the models, the minutes of the parliamentary debates about the policies, 
media reports and policy evaluations. For the first case study, 16 interviews were held 
with researchers (who developed the model), municipalities, Association of Dutch 
Municipalities, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Council for Work and 
Income, the Inspectorate on Work and Income. The second case study was based on 20 
interviews with researchers, representatives of industry and the energy sector, the 
authorization organizations, industrial and energy firms. For the third case study, 15 
interviews were held with representatives of the knowledge organization ISSO, the 
building sector’s trade organization (Bouwend Nederland) and the installation sector’s 
trade organization (Uneto-VNI), and the public–private partnership, More with Less, 
which implements a national covenant about energy saving and sustainable energy.  
The fact that the introduction of these models had distributive advantages and 
disadvantages for the actors involved was not unimportant. The knowledge-based models 
created winners and losers, and were therefore potentially conflict generating. Because of 
these political sensitivities, it was to be expected that the policy implementation arenas in 
which the models were used would be heavily ‘evidence resistant’ (Head 2007, de Bruijn 
and ten Heuvelhof 2003).  
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From a methodological viewpoint, these case studies therefore can be seen as 
least likely cases and thus critical (Patton 2001, Flyvbjerg 2006, Yin 2009). In the debate 
on case study methodology, this pattern is known as the ‘Frank Sinatra inference’ – if you 
can make it there, you can make it anywhere: if scientific knowledge in these case studies 
survives the potential conflicts, it is probable that it will do so in other, less conflictive 
arenas too (Levy 2008).  
This way of selecting cases might suggest that we follow a ‘co-variation analysis 
approach’, aimed at testing how an independent variable influences outcomes (George 
and Bennett 2005). However, our main cause is not so much to test a hypothesis, but 
rather to investigate sequential and situational combinations of causal conditions by 
pattern matching to arrive at explanations of outcomes in an inductive way. We would 
qualify our comparative case study design therefore as a qualitative ‘causal process 
tracing’ approach (Blatter and Haverland 2012). 
In section 3, we present the case studies. For each of the cases, we describe: 1) 
background information on the policy, 2) the characteristics of the model as developed 
during the process of policy formation and 3) an overview of the application of the model 
during the implementation of the policies, establishing the extent to which, and by which 
processes, the models become authoritative. In section 4, we discuss similarities and 
differences between the three cases, looking for factors that can explain why knowledge 
became authoritative or not. In section 5, we present the lessons drawn from this 
comparative analysis with regard to how knowledge may become authoritative in policy 
implementation processes.  
 
3. Three white ravens presented  
 
3.1 Case study 1: Law on Social Security and Work (WWB) 
 
Background  
On 1 January 2004, the Law on Social Security and Work (WWB) was introduced, as a 
result of which the old declaration system was replaced by the allocation of resources 
based on the objective dispensing model. The objective dispensing model is an 
8 
 
econometric model that calculates the number of assistance allowances in a region with 
parameters such as the percentage of employees in the working population and the 
percentage of low income groups aged between 15 and 64 years. The results of the model 
determine the distribution of budgets for income support among Dutch municipalities. 
The distribution incentivizes municipalities to guide benefit recipients towards paid 
labour. If municipalities disburse more than necessary according to the model, they have 
to make up the rest from their own resources. If they disburse less than their allocation 
under the model, they have a budget surplus that they can use for other projects to 
encourage benefit recipients to return to work. 
 
Development of the objective dispensing model during policy formation 
The new financial system (objective dispensing model) was developed in collaboration 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Work, implementation organizations of social 
security laws, municipalities and other stakeholders. The model itself was developed by 
universities (Erasmus University), semi-public research organizations (Dutch Economic 
Institute) and private research organizations (APE 2003, 2006, SEOR 2005). Aspects of 
the model, such as the choice and the operationalization of variables and the choice of 
databases to be used, were discussed among the stakeholders over the years.  
The exchange of ideas concerned not only the question of whether the objective 
model predicted the number of assistance allowances in a region accurately, but also the 
consequences of the introduction of the objective model in all Dutch regions. Thus, the 
implications of the new model were known before introduction. The budgets of some 
municipalities were going to increase (advantage municipalities) and those of others were 
going to decrease (disadvantage municipalities).  
The budgetary consequences of the objective model were evaluated ex ante, as 
also the plausibility of the variables, the transparency of the model, the stability of the 
model, and the relevance of the variables. After several versions of the objective model 
were discussed, one version was chosen. The idea was to introduce the model step by 
step. After some years, the objective dispensing model would completely determine the 
allocation of the national budget among local governments. During the development of 
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the model, attention focused on its detailed specifications, and no serious alternative 
models or instruments were considered.  
 
- The application ofthe objective dispensing model during policy implementation 
An evaluation of the implementation of the new law (WWB) reveals that local political 
leaders and other stakeholders agreed about the vision, goals and operation of the new 
law (Rapport Meccano 2007). The introduction of the law including the objective 
dispensing model was widely seen as a success, and the model was accepted as an 
important building block (Rapport Meccano 2007). The main components of the model 
were accepted by the ministry, implementing organizations, municipalities and others. 
There was no need to consider policy changes, although on the initiative of the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment some aspects of the model were discussed and adapted 
(definitions, data collection). In a few years, the objective dispensing model had become 
the undisputed basis to allocate the social assistance budget among municipalities.  
Municipalities not only accepted the model as the mechanism for allocation but 
also tried to gain some benefits by reintroducing welfare recipients to the labour market.  
National government developed a toolkit of measures that local government could use to 
reduce the number of allowances. Municipalities therefore had the opportunity to be 
rewarded for their improved implementation of welfare benefits. They tried to reintegrate 
social welfare beneficiaries into the work force. The acceptance of the objective 
dispensing model resulted partly from local governments feeling that they could control 
the number of allowances disbursed (Rapport Meccano 2007).  
According to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the introduction of 
the new law and the dispensing model had the effect that social security beneficiaries 
more often found paid work because local government were active in mediation leading 
to paid work. In an evaluation of the new law, it was concluded that the number of social 
security beneficiaries was reduced by 10% in the period 2003–2006, whereas it was 
estimated that without the new law this would have been 6% (SEO 2008). The reduction 
in social security spending amounted to 100 million Euro.  
The acceptance of the objective dispensing model was partly caused by the policy 
outcome (reduction in the number of social security beneficiaries). Because of the 
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success of the new law and the acceptance of the new model, a covenant was agreed upon 
by national government and the Association of Dutch Municipalities. The covenant stated 
that another 10% reduction was to be realized in the period May 2007 to the end of 2011 
(in total approximately 35,000 persons).  
Several times the objective dispensing model was evaluated by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment and some municipalities during the implementation 
process. The focus of the Ministry and the research organization was to look for 
improvement of the model. A private research organization supported this evaluation by 
investigating improvements such as the operationalization of the variables and the use of 
databases. Some minor changes of the model were realised. 
The objective dispensing model became the central mechanism for the allocation 
of money to local governments. However, if municipalities did not agree with the 
allocated amount because of local circumstances, they could submit a request to receive 
additional funding. A review committee of the Dutch government assessed the requests 
from local governments for supplementary payments (Toetsingscommissie 2010). 
Requests in the period 2004–2008 were lowest in 2006 and highest in 2008. However, the 
requests for supplementary budgets amounted to less than 0.5% of the social security 
budget. As a result of the social security budget cuts, more and more local governments 
have been finding their way to the review committee (2009: 180 local governments).  
 
Conclusion 
The objective dispensing model has become an authoritative and effective tool in social 
security policy. The model is used as the mechanism to distribute all available social 
welfare budgets among local governments. It is accepted by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment, organizations that implement social security laws, 
municipalities and other stakeholders. The authoritativeness of the model resulted partly 
from the break with unpopular policies of the past. Its authoritativeness also derived from 
the belief that the number of the social security beneficiaries would be controlled. In 
particular, local governments greatly appreciated the rewarding of proactive employment 




3.2 Case study 2: Discharge of warm water  
 
Background 
A new assessment system for warm water discharge was introduced on 21 June 2005. A 
vital part of the system was a new tool that calculates the environmental effects of warm 
water discharge. Industrial companies and energy companies are required to have a 
licence based on the Law on Pollution of Surface Water (WVO) that prohibits serious 
environmental effects. The assessment system provides guidance for standards relating 
to: 1) the intake of water, 2) the area where the discharged warm water touches the 
surrounding water (the mixing zone); this mixing zone cannot be greater than 25% of the 
cross-section of the watercourse in order to provide fish the opportunity to escape the 
heat plume, 3) the warming of surface water. The method for calculating the mixed zone 
is based on a three-dimensional simulation (3D) model, consisting of variables such as 
the flow rate, flow patterns and the amount of running water. 
 
Development of the simulation model during policy formation 
The assessment system used since 1975 was simple but not very refined. It was not 
permitted to discharge water warmer than 30 degrees Celsius. The assessment system 
was not based on knowledge available about the effects of discharge of salt or fresh warm 
water (WL Delft Hydraulics, 2003). Since the consequences of warm water discharge can 
be fatal for fish, the new assessment system used fish as the reference organism. The 
policy aimed at avoiding negative consequences for fish even in relatively unfavourable 
and rare circumstances.  
The scientific knowledge available in several countries was used to develop a 
model. The specialized governmental research agency (RIZA), responsible for inland 
water management and water purification, was asked by the Ministry of Traffic, 
Waterways and Public Works to develop a new assessment system (RIZA 2004a, 2004b). 
Because energy companies and industry were keenly interested in the issue, both sectors 
were invited to actively discuss the new system, the new simulations model and the 
calculation models, as well as the consequences for the authorization of permits. After 
literature research, the new assessment system was developed in an open communication 
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process with industry and the energy sector. This resulted in a new assessment system for 
warm water discharge as presented in the CIW report (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat 2003).  
This system ensured: 1) that the environmental effects of the heat discharge were 
acceptable and 2) that there were sufficient discharge opportunities. The new system was 
designed to assess the local effects of warm water discharge accurately. It was expected 
that the new system would increase opportunities for warm water discharge whilst at the 
same time safeguarding acceptable living conditions for fish.  
The report described problems with water intake and warm water discharge as 
well as the new policy concerning the new assessment system, including new standards. 
The CIW report was clear in its goals but did not specify the tools necessary for the 
application of the system in practice.  
Before publication of the report, the industrial and energy sectors complained that 
the new system needed further specification but the minister chose to implement the new 
assessment system without delay. Consequently, the acceptance of the model in the 
industrial and energy sectors was not without hesitation. It was stated that some aspects 
of the model (definitions, variables and their relations) were insufficiently specified. 
However, the energy sector and industry committed themselves to submit requests for a 
new licence based on the new model. The representatives accepted the new policy 
because the negativity about the old policy was stronger than the shortcomings of the new 
model based on scientific research.   
 
The application of the new assessment system during policy implementation 
An evaluation of the introduction of the new assessment system (QA
+
 2007) showed that 
the licensors and the companies assessed the idea of the new system positively. For 
relatively simple situations in which a quick scan was applied, the implementation 
process went smoothly. The application process for companies to have a quick scan was 
not too complicated, and the assessment by licensors was also relatively easy. However, 
some private organizations were not informed about the new assessment system. 
Furthermore, it sometimes proved difficult to choose between the quick scan and the 3D 
simulation. Over time, the implementation process improved gradually, by more and 
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earlier knowledge transfer, and by organizing communication between companies and the 
competent authorities.  
For more complex requests for heat discharge, the implementation process proved 
difficult. Discussions arose between permit applicants and the competent authorities 
about the definitions of the assessment system, the framework conditions for the water 
system, acceptance of the data used and the handling of the calculation tools. In one case, 
the results of the 3D simulation delivered by a specialized research company to the 
energy company did not match the results of the 3D simulation of the competent 
authorities. As a result, the authorities had on the one hand to deal with the permit 
application and on the other to evaluate the scientific value of the new 3D simulation. An 
additional source of irritation during implementation was that an investment of 40,000–
70,000 Euro in 3D research by a specialized research organization that was qualified to 
use the new assessment system did not provide the intended clarity. 
Mainly because of the problems in the licensing procedures, the ministry, industry 
and energy companies decided to fine-tune the new assessment model. Under the 
direction of the Ministry of Traffic, Waterways and Public works and supported by 
governmental research agencies (WL Delft Hydraulics, RIZA) the model was improved 
by elaborated definitions and adapted operationalization of variables. Furthermore, a 
protocol for the implementation of 3D simulations was developed. This clarified details 
about the application of the method, and described procedural steps and the different 
responsibilities during each of the procedural steps (Deltares, 2008). Some definitions 
were changed and some tools were described in more detail. The new protocol offered 
both the firms and the authorities support in their communication. Consequently, the 
course of the assessment process had a predictable outcome for both parties (WL 
Hydraulics 2007). In sum, after the increase in implementation problems, the CIW report 
was elaborated with a new protocol that provided the authorities and firms clarity and 
predictability about the implementation process. 
 
Conclusion  
All in all, the new assessment method for the effects of warm water discharge became 
authoritative – but not without problems. After several years, the decision to allow warm 
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water discharge and to provide the licence was based completely on the new model. 
Whereas the model was too abstract as initially introduced, it was further refined and 
fine-tuned during implementation. Following criticism from industry and energy 
companies, the procedural steps and the tools used during assessment were improved. As 
a result, the permit applicants and licensors were clear about the new policy and its 
implementation. After four years, the model was accepted by government, industry and 
energy companies. The model and the related instruments have helped to prevent 
negative environmental impacts but allow warm water discharge when possible.  
 
3.3 Case study 3: Energy Performance Building Directive (EPBD)  
 
Background 
Since 1 January 2008, Dutch homeowners who sell their property are required to provide 
an energy label to the new owner. The label indicates the energy performance of the 
property and therefore the environmental consequences in terms of CO2 emissions. The 
energy performance and therefore the label is based on a model that calculates the Energy 
Index using variables such as the use of insulation, double glazing and the heating 
appliance. The label is the primary tool of government policy to obtain energy saving in 
the existing housing stock. In order to be effective and to limit the use of energy in 
households, the label should be used not only as a description of the actual energy 
performance but also as a legal norm. The energy label for buildings has the status of a 
legal standard, but the energy label for homes does not.  
 
Development of the EPBD during policy formation 
In the early 1990s, knowledge was developed by specialized private research 
organizations about the energy performance of houses and buildings. This knowledge 
was processed into a legal standard for the energy performance of new houses and 
buildings (the energy performance coefficient), which came into force on 1 January 1995. 
The so-called energy performance standard (EPN) offered government a tool to improve 
the energy performance of new houses. The method for calculating the energy 
performance coefficient has been the subject of extensive research. Over the years, the 
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results of this research was programmed and discussed within the Dutch normalization 
institute (NEN). Within this organizational setting private research organizations, policy 
officials of governments, and private organizations in the building sector cooperated to 
develop the professional standards to assess the energy performance. 
After the introduction of the EPN for new buildings, a model was developed for 
the energy performance of existing houses. This resulted in the introduction of the (not 
compulsory) energy performance advice (EPA) in 2003. In the same period, in 2002, the 
European Parliament adopted the Energy Performance Building Directive (EPBD). Since 
then, the EPBD has been the main legislative instrument for improving the energy 
performance of the building stock (European Union 2011). It took until 1 January 2008 
before the EPBD came into force in the Netherlands. The method of calculating the 
EPBD (Energy Index) is a further development of the EPA model. The Energy Index is 
processed in review guidelines that are accepted as the standard for the professional 
groups in the building sector (ISSO 2008a, 2008b). The review guidelines are seen as a 
way to improve the quality of the Energy Index and thus to guarantee the quality of the 
energy label. The Dutch model is elaborate but in comparison with other countries not 
overly detailed (European Union 2011).  
In addition to the development of the guidelines for the Energy Index, the Dutch 
normalization institute developed the Energy Diagnosis Reference (EDR) that contains 
standards to assess whether a specific calculation method (or software in which these 
methods are used) is suitable to measure houses’ energy performance and to calculate the 
energetic and financial consequences of saving measures (Beoordelingsrichtlijn 9501). 
Another assessment directive contains standards for companies that deliver energy advice 
(Beoordelingsrichtlijn 9500). These standards relate to both the training requirements for 
persons and to demands made on organizations. The calculation method for the Energy 
Index has been carefully specified and is included in teaching materials of various 
professional groups in the building sector. Quality is assured by random checks of the 
characteristics of the energy labels awarded.  
After more than a decade of scientific research, models have been developed to 
describe and explain first the energy performance of new homes and then existing houses 
and buildings. The models have been accepted by the Ministry of Housing, private 
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organizations in the building sector, representatives of homeowners, the social housing 
sector and representatives of private tenants. The urgent need for policy instruments to 
reduce CO2 emissions supported the introduction of the models.  
 
The application of the EPBD during policy implementation 
By the end of 2010, 1.7 million residences had been provided with an energy label (24% 
of the housing stock). Decisions about the label classification of houses and buildings are 
completely based on the outcomes of the model. Especially as a result of the active 
cooperation of the housing corporations, large groups of properties have acquired an 
energy label. Because of the similarities of houses in the same blocks, great quantities of 
labels could be delivered in a relatively cheap and easy way. Compared to tenants, 
owner-residents rarely have an energy label (approximately 5% of owner-residents). This 
cannot be explained by a lack of qualified advisors in business to deliver the energy label. 
About 250 companies are qualified to provide it, and around 200 companies are qualified 
to deliver advice that includes energy conservation measures (e.g. investment costs, 
payback times, environmental effects).  
The acceptance of the model (Energy Index) was put to the test in practice. On the 
national TV news it was reported that the results of the calculations (Energy Index, 
energy labels) proved to be arbitrary. A study by the Inspectorate of the Ministry of 
Housing in 2010 showed that eight out of 30 calculations resulted in an Energy Index that 
differed substantially. In four of the 30 cases, the houses should have been given a 
different label class (VROM Inspectorate 2010). A study by an association of owner-
residents (Vereniging Eigen Huis) came to the same conclusion. Property characteristics 
were often recorded erroneously (VROM Inspectorate 2010). Incorrect imports into the 
software and the incorrect execution of instructions and schemes were the most important 
sources of errors. 
In order to meet the expectations of the Inspectorate, the calculation method was 
improved. In actual practice this was done in the Dutch normalization institute that 
provides the platform to improve professional standards in the building sector. The 
following measures came into force on 1 January 2010: 1) definitions and extensions of 
tables were adjusted; 2) instructions for the calculation method were improved (for 
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example: calculation method for the thermal peel). Furthermore the quality of 
organizations and advisors was assessed which resulted in the withdrawal of he 
accreditation of 25% of the approved people/organizations. In addition  to this, new 
requirements for EPBD advisors and new exams for existing advisors were imposed.  
In addition a procedure was developed that prescribed the way to handle 
complaints about a given label. Dissatisfied homeowners or housing cooperatives can 
send their grievances about their label to a complaints desk. In addition, homeowners can 
address disputes about the Energy Index and/or the label to the National Disputes 
Committee. Since 2010, no complaints have been submitted to this committee. 
Apparently, the model is the determining factor in the choice of energy label to classify 
energy performance (Geschillencommissie 2010).  
At the end of 2010, the minister announced measures to ensure that energy labels 
were provided when homes changed hands. Without an energy label attached to the legal 
transfer of ownership, a house cannot be registered to the new owner in the land registry 
(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2010). Furthermore, sanctions 
are foreseen if the energy label is not included in sales or rental advertisements. As yet, 
no policy decision has been made on whether to set minimum standards for the energy 
performance of existing houses.  
 
Conclusion 
The model (Energy Index) is accepted as the determining factor for the classification of 
house energy labels. The model has endured criticism since its introduction in 2008, but 
because of improvements in the model and the instructions that support its 
implementation, the Energy Index has become the most important policy instrument to 
reduce CO2 emissions in houses. The policy focus has now shifted to a drive to ensure 
that labels are provided to the new owners when houses are sold.  
 
4. The three ravens compared  
 
Comparison of the case studies shows that none of the policy implementation arenas 
studied proved to be completely evidence resistant. The scientific knowledge, the models 
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and calculation methods were not only used as starting points of new policy, but also 
contributed to policy implementation. However, the case studies differ in the extent to 
which the authority of the models was accepted. In cases 2 and 3, the models were 
criticized and required amendment. In other words: the ravens were not as white as we 
initially assumed. During the process their colours fluctuated, only gradually turning 
white and perhaps leaving some black feathers or a veil of grey.  
The comparative analysis of the cases brings to light the following factors that 
influence the authoritativeness of scientific knowledge.  
 
1. The quality of scientific knowledge  
In all three cases, policymakers invested in the development of scientific knowledge over 
several years. The objective dispensing model, the 3D simulation and the Energy Index 
were the result of elaborate and solid scientific research. The various research institutes 
were capable of demonstrating the quality of the developed models and calculation 
methods. The lack of conflict over the models, despite their redistributive implications, 
may be explained by the fact that their scientific bases was accepted by policymakers, 
implementing organizations, target groups, representatives of target groups and 
stakeholders in the implementation process. The models contributed to the 
depoliticization of debates, although not to the same extent in all cases. In the warm 
water discharge case, the model was less well-developed than in the other cases. As a 
result, the knowledge base of the model was questioned. The social security case shows 
that, although a sound scientific knowledge base is important, other factors contribute to 
the authoritativeness of the models too.  
 
2. Adjustment to specific circumstances 
The models and methods in each of the case studies were designed to deal with the 
specific characteristics of the situation in which they were to be applied. The objective 
dispensing model uses data relating to the regional or local situation as provided by the 
Central Statistics Office. Although the models aim at describing a specific regional or 
local situation, a need for adjustment arose when the models were initially applied in the 
policy implementation process. Apparently, there is a gap that is hard to bridge between 
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generic objective calculation methods and the unique, specific situations in 
implementation practice. Although the models were developed to describe regional and 
local circumstances, they failed to do so in detail. This seems to be a fundamental barrier 
to the knowledge base in public policy. In each of the cases, it proved necessary to further 
improve and fine-tune the model and methods during implementation.  
 
3. Methods to safeguard scientific quality during implementation 
The translation of the method to its application in policy implementation practices is 
susceptible to errors. The data input for the Energy Index went wrong because certified 
consultants made more mistakes than expected. Up to 25% of the certified consultants 
lost their qualification as EPBD advisor because of errors in the application of the 
method. In the warm water discharge case also the application of the model had to be 
improved. This was accomplished by making agreements on a strict research protocol for 
3D modelling among the different parties involved. No matter how strong the scientific 
knowledge base of policy is, arrangements are need to safeguard scientific quality during 
the implementation process.  
 
4. Involvement of target groups and experts in knowledge production 
In none of the three case studies were the models developed completely separate from 
policy implementation practice. From the start, target groups, stakeholders, relevant 
representatives of policy actors and experts were involved in the development of the 
models and the methods. This may explain why the parties involved trusted the models 
and the policies in which these were used. Stakeholder involvement is not without risks 
though. It can easily result in ‘capture,’ where the results of the research are influenced 
by the interests of stakeholders (Wilson 1989). In the warm water discharge case, the 
involvement of the energy sector and industry could have impeded the effectiveness of 
the new system because of their interest in reducing costs and preventing the loss of 
profits. In this case, the risk of capture was countered by the active involvement of other 
stakeholders, governments and research organizations. Despite the involvement of 
stakeholders in ex ante knowledge production, the policies and models needed adjustment 
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during their application, as the other factors indicate. Apparently, early stakeholder 
involvement is not enough to gain authoritativeness.    
 
5. Opportunities for stakeholders to anticipate a new policy practice 
Because of their involvement during research activities, implementing organizations and 
stakeholders were well informed about the characteristics of the models and their 
consequences. Thus, they were able to anticipate the new policies and the models used. 
This enhanced their acceptance. In the objective dispensing case, municipalities could 
anticipate its introduction by improving their proactive employment policies in order to 
avoid budget cuts. In the warm water discharge case, the ministry chose not to take time 
to assess the consequences of the new assessment system. As a result, a legal battle 
emerged, jeopardizing the authoritativeness of the model. Eventually, the conflict was 
settled by the adjustment of the 3D model and by drafting a protocol for procedural steps 
that should guide its application in the implementation process.  
 
6. Intermediary and mitigating arrangements 
Despite their sound knowledge base, the case studies show that the models could not gain 
authority during implementation on their own. Their generic characteristics did not 
succeed in coping with the unique  characteristics of implementation situations. 
Additional arrangements were necessary to bridge this gap. In the social security case, a 
review commission (Toetsingscommissie WWB) assessed whether local governments 
that did not accept the outcomes of the model were entitled to a supplementary 
allowance. In the warm water discharge case, legal procedures were used to discuss the 
3D model. Consequently, procedural steps were described, and the role of the permit 
applicant as well as the licensor was defined. The calculation of the Energy Index can be 
checked by the homeowner or the housing corporation in a complaints procedure. These 
intermediary and mitigating arrangements support the acceptance of the model. If an 
actor is of the opinion that the model is not suitable for a specific situation, these 
arrangements are used to discuss the model and, if necessary, decisions are corrected. 
Such arrangements prevent the model needing further refinement in order to cope with 
every conceivable detail. Of course, there is a risk that parties will act strategically and 
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try to systematically bypass the model. The fact that in the social security case 180 
municipalities asked for an additional budget allocation in 2009 is an indication of this 
risk (Toetsingscommissie 2010). This risk can partly be countered if the review 
commission refrains from opportunistically making exceptions to avoid conflicts and 
only makes exceptions on the basis of substantive arguments. 
 
7. Interests of the parties in the results of the model 
In the three cases, the new models might have become a serious threat to the parties 
involved in policy implementation, since the models reallocated gains and losses. 
However, in the social security case, municipalities that were going to receive less 
assistance funding did not resist the model. The perception that they had the opportunity 
to improve their employment measures and increase their incomes may explain this. In 
addition, many disliked the old system of social security delivery. This historical context 
provided a shared interest in the new model. In the warm water discharge case, the 
outcome of calculations using the model might result in a refusal to grant a licence. This 
could mean that a firm had to postpone its production process or even that it had to move. 
At the same time, the companies had a shared interest in changing the old system of 
assessment. In most cases, the new system offered the possibility to discharge more warm 
water than before. The Energy Index and the energy label were only to inform 
homeowners and did not include the obligation to invest in energy conservation 
measures. The moderate response of homeowners reflected the academic and non-
binding nature of the energy label. The difference between this and the other two cases is 
that this seemed to result in non-implementation. It may well be that this raven will turn 
black when the current policy becomes obligatory. 
 
5. Conclusion: lessons learned from the three ravens 
 
As it turns out, in policies in which the use of expertise and research affects the existing 
distribution of costs and benefits among relevant parties, knowledge and rationality may 
still matter. In the cases at hand, models based on scientific research contributed to the 
development of new implementation practices and to the quality of the policy. 
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Nevertheless, it is quite a challenge to make knowledge authoritative in such an 
implementation setting. The cases differed in the degree to which they lived up to their 
status as white ravens in the implementation process. In cases 2 and 3, the models 
became the subject of conflict, but even though the negative media attention in case 3 
damaged support for the model, it was not altogether fatal to its authoritativeness. What 
generic lessons can be learned from these cases about the conditions under which 
knowledge can become authoritative in implementation practices? 
The first lesson relates to the quality of the knowledge generation process. The 
knowledge in the various cases had a solid scientific foundation; much time and expertise 
were invested in the development of the models. Although this was an important success 
condition, it was neither the only nor the decisive one. Another very important factor was 
the fact that stakeholders were involved in the process. They participated in discussions 
about the conditions under which the models were developed. In these cases, knowledge 
was not injected into the practice, which would have been in line with an instrumental 
approach to knowledge use. This participation in knowledge production, however, may 
be subject to certain requirements. Because of capture, interests may penetrate into the 
knowledge generation process to such an extent that the research results will not bear the 
scrutiny of criticism (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 2003). It is important that 
representatives of the various stakeholders participate in the process, and that the 
boundary work that safeguards the independence of the expertise vis-à-vis the policy 
process is adequately executed (see also Jasanoff 1994, Bijker et al. 2009, Gieryn 1983).  
A second lesson concerns the way in which the generated knowledge is applied in 
the policy practice during implementation. Knowledge-based policy designs, or evidence-
based policies, cannot simply be deployed in practice. Authoritativeness requires 
continuous interaction between knowledge producers, policymakers and implementers, 
and fine-tuning. The cases demonstrate three ways to adjust knowledge-based policies to 
specific implementation reality: fine-tuning, safeguarding the quality of the 
implementation, and mitigation and compensation mechanisms. In addition, 
policymakers should find ways to align interests (will) and knowledge. Will and 
knowledge do not necessarily exclude each other.  
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Thirdly, in looking for this alignment a major risk is that knowledge generation 
will dissolve in the social negotiation process between policymakers and stakeholders. 
Since the process of knowledge production and the application of knowledge cannot be 
separated, strategic behaviour by actors may drive out knowledge in both these processes.  
Arrangements are needed to mitigate strategic behaviour and safeguard the quality of 
scientific knowledge generation. The absence of conflict in the three cases might indicate 
that actors succeeded in manoeuvring unwanted evidence out of the arena. Although our 
research observed the risk of this type of behaviour, our observations regarding the 
development of the models, the impacts of these models on the policies and the way the 
processes evolved indicated that these tendencies were limited and did not compromise 
the objective, scientific nature of the models. 
This article has identified several mechanisms that affect the authoritativeness of 
knowledge in three critical cases of policy implementation in which scientifically 
developed models distributed advantages and disadvantages. Our knowledge about these 
mechanisms and the pitfalls involved remains limited and calls for further research. 
Firstly, further research is needed to establish whether or not these mechanisms manifest 
themselves in the same way in other policy settings. Secondly, further research might 
identity other mechanisms that may be at play. Thirdly, research is needed to learn more 
about the relative importance of the factors: are these factors sufficient or necessary 
conditions, and can one factor be compensated by another?  
Practically, the case studies demonstrate that scientists and policy implementers 
are not empty handed when it comes to furthering the use of scientific knowledge in the 
practice of public policymaking and implementation. They have a repertoire of options 
that range from involving stakeholders in the knowledge production process, to adapting 
knowledge basis in between, refining it, integrating it with tacit expertise, commons 
knowledge and emerging new insights (learning), installing compensating mechanism 
and prudent implementation.  
 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank the researchers of the group Comparative Public Service 
Innovation (CPSI) at the Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Social 
24 
 
Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam, for their constructive comments on an earlier 




APE, 2003. Een nieuw verdeelmodel voor de Wet Werk en Bijstand, in: Tweede Kamer, 
2002-2003, 28.870, nr.13.  
APE, 2006.Verbeterpotentieel van het objectieve verdeelmodel, in: Tweede Kamer, 2005-
2006, 30.545, nr.3.  
APE, 2010. Macrobudget Inkomensdeel WWB 2010, in: Council Municipality of The 
Hague, BSW 2010-2011, RIS175780.  
Banks, G., 2009. Evidence-based policy making: What is it? How do we get it? Available 
from: http://www.pc.gov.au/speeches/cs20090204 [Accessed 4 June 2010]. 
Berkhout, F., 2010. Reconstructing boundaries and reason in the climate debate. Global 
Environmental Change, 20, 565–569. 
Bijker, W.E., Bal, R., and Hendriks, R., 2009. The paradox of scientific authority. The 
role of scientific advice in democracies Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press  
Blatter, J. and Haverland, M. 2012. Designing case studies. Explanatory approaches in 
     small-n research. Houndsmills Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Collins, H. and Evans, R., 2007. Rethinking expertise. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
de Bruijn, H. and ten Heuvelhof, E., 2003. Policy analysis and decision making in a 
network. How to improve the quality of analysis and the impact on decision making. 
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 20, 232–242.  
de Bruijn, J.A. and Leijten, M., 2010. Megaprojects and contested information. In: H. 
Priemus, B. Flyvbjerg, and B. van Wee, eds. Decision-making on mega projects. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 84–101. 
Davies, H., Nutley, S., and Smith, P., eds., 2000. What works? Evidence-based policy 
and practice in public services, Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Deltares, 2008. Richtlijnen voor de rapportage van 3D-modelsimulaties. Lelystad: 
Ministry of Transport and Water Management, RIZA.  
25 
 
European Union, 2011. Implementing the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive, 
country reports 2010. Brussels: ??. 
Flyvbjerg, B., 2006. Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative 
Inquiry, 12 (2), 219–245. 
Flyvbjerg, B., 2008. Public planning of mega-projects: overestimation of demand and 
underestimation of costs. In: H. Priemus, B. Flyvbjerg, and B. van Wee, eds. Decision-
making on mega projects. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 120–144. 
George, A. and Bennett, A. 2005. Case studies and theory development in the social 
sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Geschillencommissie, 2011. Jaarverslag 2010. The Hague: Geschillencommissie.  
Gibbons, M., C. Limonges, H. Nowotny, S. Scott and M. Trow, 1994. The new 
production of knowledge: the dynamics of science and research in contemporary 
societies. London: Sage. 
Gieryn, T.F., 1983. Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science. 
American Sociological Review, 48 (6), 781–795. 
Head, B.W., 2007. Research and evaluation. Three lenses of evidence based policy. The 
Australian Journal of Public Administration, 67 (1), 1–11. 
Hess C. and Ostrom, E., eds., 2006. Understanding knowledge as a commons. From 
theory to practice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Hoppe, R., 1999. Policy analysis, science and politics, from ‘speaking truth to power’ to 
‘making sense together.’ Science and Public Policy, 26 (3), 201–210. 
in ‘t Veld, R.J., ed., 2000. Willingly and knowlingly: the roles of knowledge about nature 
and the environment in policy processes. Utrecht: Lemma. 
ISSO, 2008a. Handleiding energieprestatie advies utiliteitsbouw. (75.1, 75.2). 
Rotterdam: ISSO.  
ISSO, 2008b. Handleiding energieprestatie advies woningen. (82.1, 82.2). Rotterdam: 
ISSO. 
Jasanoff, S., 1994. The fifth branch. Science advisers as policy makers. Cambridge, 
MA/London: Harvard University Press.   




Levy, Jack S., 2008. Case studies: types, designs, and logics of inference. Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, 25 (1), 1–18.  
Mazmanian, D.A. and P.A. Sabatier, 1981. Effective policy implementation. Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books. 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004. CIW-beoordelingssystematiek warmtelozing. 
The Hague: Ministry of Transport and Water Management. 
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijkrelaties, 2010. Directoraat Wonen, 
Werken en Integratie, Sanctionering Energielabel Gebouwen, in Handelingen Tweede 
Kamer, vergaderjaar 2011/2012, kamerstuk 30.196 nr.124. 
Noordergraaf, M., 2000. Attention! Work and behaviour of public managers amidst 
ambiguity. Delft: Eburon.  
Nowotny, H., Scott, P., and Gibbons, M., 2001. Rethinking science. Knowledge and the 
public in an age of uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
O'Toole, L.J., 1988. 'Strategies for intergovernmental management: Implementing 
programs in interorganizational networks', International Journal of Public 
Administration, 11, 417-441. 
Patton, M., 1997. Utilization-focused evaluation. 3rd ed. London: Sage. 
Patton, M.Q., 2001. Qualitative research and evaluation methods. 2nd ed. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Pawson, R., 2006. Evidence-based policy: a realist perspective. London: Sage. 
Polanyi, M., 2009. The tacit dimension. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
QA
+
, 2007., Evaluatie Vergunningverlening beoordelingsystematiek Warmtelozing. 
Leiden: Questions, Answers and More. 
Radin, B., 2002. Beyond Machiavelli—policy analysis comes of age. Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University 1101 Press. 
Rapport Meccano, 2007. Werkt de WWB? Resultaten van de ontwikkeling van nieuwe 
verhoudingen tussen rijk en gemeenten. Utrecht: Meccano. 
RIZA, 2004a. Effecten van koelwater op het zoete aquatische milieu. Lelystad: Ministry 
of Transport and Water Management, RIZA.  
RIZA, 2004b. Effecten van koelwater op het zoute aquatische milieu, Lelystad: Ministry 
of Transport and Water Management, RIZA. 
27 
 
Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C., 1993. Policy change and learning. An advocacy 
coalition approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.   
SEO, 2008. Evaluatie verdeelmodel Wet Werk en Bijstand. The Hague: SEO.  
SEOR, 2005. Inventarisatie verbetermogelijkheden objectief verdeelmodel WWB. 
Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam.  
Solesbury, W., 2001. Evidence based policy: whence it came and where it’s going. 
(Working paper 1). London: University of London.  
Toetsingscommissie, 2010. Jaarverslag 2009. The Hague: Ministry of Social Affairs. 
VROM, 2010. Betrouwbaarheid van energielabels bij woningen, herhalingsonderzoek. 
Publication number: VI-2010-01, The Hague: Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning 
and Environment.  
Weiss, C., 1977. Using social research in public policy making. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington-Health. 
Wildavsky, A., 1979. Speaking truth to power: the art and craft of policy analysis. 
Boston: Little, Brown.  
Wildavsky, A., (1995) But is it true. A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental Health and 
Safety Issues, Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press. 
Wilson, J.Q., 1989. Bureaucracy. What government agencies do and why they do it. New 
York: Basic Books.  
WL Delft Hydraulics, 2003. Warmtelozing in oppervlaktewater en uitwisseling met de 
atmosfeer. Delft: WL Delft Hydraulics.  
WL Delft Hydraulics, 2007. Implementeren van verbeteringen in het landelijk 
temperatuurmodel. Delft: WL Delft Hydraulics.   
Yin, R.J., 2009. Case study research: design and methods. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE.  
